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Single Idea 5940
[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
]
Full Idea
It may be that two orders or classes of good things are not commensurable, though they are comparable, with those in the other.
Clarification
'Commensurable' means able to compare by measurement
Gist of Idea
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable
Source
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
Book Ref
Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.154
A Reaction
This refers to moral issues, but seems helpful when faced with Kuhn's claim that Newton and Einstein are 'incommensurable'. We could hardly prefer one theory to another if we couldn't compare them.
The
40 ideas
from W. David Ross
7259
|
Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought
[Ross, by Dancy,J]
|
5898
|
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man'
[Ross]
|
5899
|
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty
[Ross]
|
5904
|
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted
[Ross]
|
5900
|
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty
[Ross]
|
5913
|
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics
[Ross]
|
5910
|
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure
[Ross]
|
5914
|
An act may be described in innumerable ways
[Ross]
|
5911
|
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics
[Ross]
|
5905
|
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure
[Ross]
|
5906
|
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences
[Ross]
|
5908
|
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance
[Ross]
|
5909
|
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself
[Ross, by PG]
|
5912
|
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity
[Ross]
|
5916
|
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things
[Ross]
|
5915
|
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any
[Ross]
|
5917
|
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others
[Ross]
|
5922
|
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances
[Ross]
|
5921
|
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness
[Ross]
|
5928
|
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events
[Ross]
|
5926
|
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it
[Ross]
|
5927
|
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions
[Ross]
|
5924
|
Identical objects must have identical value
[Ross]
|
5920
|
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind)
[Ross]
|
5923
|
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality
[Ross]
|
5918
|
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed
[Ross]
|
5919
|
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct
[Ross]
|
5930
|
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious
[Ross]
|
5933
|
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight
[Ross]
|
5932
|
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge
[Ross]
|
5929
|
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired
[Ross]
|
5931
|
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better
[Ross]
|
5939
|
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth
[Ross]
|
5938
|
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is
[Ross]
|
5937
|
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction
[Ross]
|
5936
|
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain
[Ross]
|
5940
|
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable
[Ross]
|
5941
|
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right
[Ross]
|
5942
|
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty
[Ross]
|
18622
|
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being
[Ross]
|