more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Actions are morally good in virtue of their motives; this is quite distinct from rightness, which belongs to act in virtue of the nature of what is done. So a good action may not do what is right, and a right action need not be morally good.
Gist of Idea
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right
Source
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VII)
Book Ref
Ross,W.David: 'The Right and the Good' [OUP 1930], p.156
A Reaction
This sounds neat, but it is hard to find clearcut examples to confirm it. Having your cat put down may be right but not good, but presumably your motive was good.
| 7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
| 2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
| 5902 | For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
| 5903 | 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE] |
| 5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
| 5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
| 5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
| 5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
| 5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
| 15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |