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Full Idea
Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause.
Gist of Idea
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause
Source
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b
Book Ref
Plutarch: 'Moralia - vol 13 part 2', ed/tr. Cherniss,Harold [Harvard Loeb 1993], p.595
A Reaction
This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes?
| 1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
| 5971 | Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch] |
| 6214 | Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes] |
| 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
| 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
| 19368 | The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz] |
| 5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
| 2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
| 3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
| 15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
| 6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
| 6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |