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Single Idea 6051

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic ]

Full Idea

If we say 'for some x, x is F and x is G' we are making tacit appeal to the idea of identity in using 'x' twice here: it has to be the same object that is both F and G.

Clarification

F and G stand for properties

Gist of Idea

In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.8


A Reaction

This may well be broadened to any utterances whatsoever. The only remaining question is to speculate about whether it is possible to think without identities. The Hopi presumably gave identity to processes rather objects. How does God think?


The 16 ideas with the same theme [logical assertions that that two objects are identical]:

Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey]
Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee]
The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock]
The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey]
Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine]
Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
|= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock]
If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock]
The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock]
Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie]
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes]
Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]