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Single Idea 6053
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
]
Full Idea
Identity has a universality and basicness that is hard to overstate; concepts don't get more basic than this - or more indispensable.
Gist of Idea
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
Source
Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.9
A Reaction
I agree with this. It seems to me to follow that the natural numbers are just as basic, because they are entailed by the separateness of the identities of things. And the whole of mathematics is the science of the patterns within these numbers.
The
40 ideas
from 'Logical Properties'
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6042
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The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool
[McGinn]
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6054
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Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
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6050
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Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity
[McGinn]
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6052
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Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity
[McGinn]
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6058
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Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role
[McGinn]
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6053
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Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be
[McGinn]
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6043
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Type-identity is close similarity in qualities
[McGinn]
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6044
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Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties
[McGinn]
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6046
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Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved
[McGinn]
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6051
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In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements
[McGinn]
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6055
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Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation
[McGinn]
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6059
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Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation
[McGinn]
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6049
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Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py'
[McGinn]
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6045
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It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance'
[McGinn]
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6047
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All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true
[McGinn]
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6048
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Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity
[McGinn]
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6071
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Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances
[McGinn]
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6072
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If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence
[McGinn]
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6073
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I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined
[McGinn]
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6066
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Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
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6062
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence
[McGinn]
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6065
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties
[McGinn]
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6067
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Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists'
[McGinn]
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6069
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'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied
[McGinn]
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6068
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We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition
[McGinn]
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6064
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Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation
[McGinn]
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6070
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality
[McGinn]
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6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
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6077
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Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects
[McGinn]
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6074
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Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning?
[McGinn]
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6080
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Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties
[McGinn]
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6079
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If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
[McGinn]
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6081
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Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge
[McGinn]
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6082
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities
[McGinn]
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6088
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Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions
[McGinn]
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6083
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The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs
[McGinn]
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6084
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'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall
[McGinn]
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6085
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The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence
[McGinn]
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6086
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Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts
[McGinn]
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6087
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Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony
[McGinn]
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