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Single Idea 6058

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity ]

Full Idea

Identity propositions are not always analytic or a priori (as Frege long ago taught us) so there is nothing trivial about such propositions; the claim of redundancy ignores the epistemic role that the concept of identity plays.

Gist of Idea

Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.13

A Reaction

He is referring to Frege's Morning Star/Evening Star distinction (Idea 4972). Wittgenstein wanted to eliminate our basic metaphysics by relabelling it as analytic or tautological, but his project failed. Long live metaphysics!

Related Idea

Idea 4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]

The 33 ideas with the same theme [how we should understand the idea of identity]:

11380 Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
19394 Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
1207 Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
21290 Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
16022 The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
11100 Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
4893 Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
6056 Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
17588 We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
10522 The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]