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Single Idea 6077

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics ]

Full Idea

Semantics should not employ the relationship of set-membership between objects and extensions, but rather the relation of instantiation between objects and properties.

Clarification

'Instantiation' is there being an actual instance or case of something

Gist of Idea

Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects

Source

Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3)

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.68

A Reaction

At least this means that philosophers won't be required to read fat books on set theory, but they will have to think very carefully about 'instantiation'. A good start is the ideas on 'Partaking' of Platonic Forms in this database (in 'Universals').

The 17 ideas with the same theme [giving meaning in the manner laid out by Gottlob Frege]:

11126 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
8164 Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
9817 Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
8171 Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
4954 Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
7304 Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7309 Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7312 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
16349 Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati]
7313 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A]
9836 Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
7331 A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
7327 Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
6077 Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
16382 Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati]
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]