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Full Idea
If we replace modal words like 'possible' with quantification across worlds, clearly the notion of 'world' must exclude impossible worlds, otherwise 'possibly p' will be true if 'p' holds in an impossible world.
Clarification
'Quantification' asserts what a proposition is referring to
Gist of Idea
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds
Source
Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4)
Book Ref
McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.70
A Reaction
The point here, of course, is that the question is being begged of what 'possible' and 'impossible' actually mean.
| 16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
| 16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
| 6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |