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Full Idea
It is quite clear that propositions are not what you might call 'real'; if you were making an inventory of the world, propositions would not come in.
Clarification
An 'inventory' is a catalogue
Gist of Idea
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
Source
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III)
Book Ref
Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.70
A Reaction
I am not clear why this is "quite clear". Propositions might even turn up in our ontology as physical objects (brain states). He says beliefs are real, but if you can't have a belief without a proposition, and they aren't real, you are in trouble.
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |