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Single Idea 6097

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error ]

Full Idea

It is very difficult to deal with the theory of error without assuming the existence of the non-existent.

Gist of Idea

The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §IV.3)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.81


A Reaction

This problem really bothered Russell (and Plato). I suspect that it was a self-inflicted problem because at this point Russell had ceased to believe in propositions. If we accept propositions as intentional objects, they can be as silly as you like.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [how incorrect judgements occur]:

I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza]
Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell]
Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell]
The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein]