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Single Idea 6102

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names ]

Full Idea

If you understand English you would understand the phrase 'the author of Waverley' if you had not heard it before, whereas you would not understand the meaning of 'Scott', because to know the meaning of a name is to know who it is applied to.

Gist of Idea

You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.102

A Reaction

Actually, you would find 'Waverley' a bit baffling too. Would you understand "he was the author of his own destruction"? You can understand "Homer was the author of this" without knowing quite who 'Homer' applies to. All very tricky.

The 32 ideas from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

18348 Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
21708 Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
19051 Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
7744 Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5465 Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
18376 Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
6060 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
21702 In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
9022 Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
6091 Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
6090 Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
6089 Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
6092 In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
6093 The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
6094 An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
6095 The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
6096 I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
6097 The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
6098 Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
6099 Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
6100 Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
6101 Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
6102 You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
6119 You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]
6103 Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
6106 Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
6105 Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
6104 Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
10423 There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
10426 A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
21712 I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
21709 You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]