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Single Idea 6111

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts ]

Full Idea

Since any proposition can be put into a form with a subject and a predicate, united by a copula, it is natural to infer that every fact consists in the possession of a quality by a substance, which seems to me a mistake.

Clarification

'Is' is an example of a copula

Gist of Idea

As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form

Source

Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.152)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.152


A Reaction

This disagrees with McGinn on facts (Idea 6075). I approve of this warning from Russell, which is a recognition that we can't just infer our metaphysics from our language. I think of this as the 'Frege Fallacy', which ensnared Quine and others.

Related Idea

Idea 6075 Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about facts]:

Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein]
A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam]
We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences [Crane]
Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K]
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
What counts as a fact partly depends on the availability of human concepts to describe them [O'Grady]
No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber]
Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]