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Single Idea 6112

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning ]

Full Idea

There is not one relation of meaning between words and what they stand for, but as many relations of meaning, each of a different logical type, as there are logical types among the objects for which there are words.

Gist of Idea

Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types

Source

Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.153)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.153

A Reaction

This might be a good warning for those engaged in the externalist/internalist debate over the meaning of concepts such as natural kind terms like 'water'. I could have an external meaning for 'elms', but an internal meaning for 'ferns'.

The 30 ideas with the same theme [how one thing can represent another thing]:

19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce]
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
23450 Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M]
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
2346 Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam]
15667 To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
21932 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21886 Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
21930 For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
21884 Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
21935 The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
21933 Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21894 Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
6387 A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
3451 Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
3078 Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
2439 Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
2457 If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
21654 The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber]
14717 Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter]