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Single Idea 6116

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis ]

Full Idea

We are trying to create a perfectly logical language to prevent inferences from the nature of language to the nature of the world, which are fallacious because they depend upon the logical defects of language.

Gist of Idea

A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language

Source

Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.159)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.159


A Reaction

Wittgenstein seems to have rebelled against this idea, so that one strand of his later philosophy leads to 'ordinary language' philosophy, which is exactly what Russell is criticising. Wittgenstein seems to have seen 'logical language' as an oxymoron.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [using logic as a tool for analysing concepts and truths]:

Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce]
Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege]
Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine]
When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell]
Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden]
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K]
Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]