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Single Idea 6121

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism ]

Full Idea

There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them.

Gist of Idea

There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions

Source

DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198)

Book Ref

'Mind vol.XCIX 1990', ed/tr. Blackburn,Simon [OUP 1990], p.198


A Reaction

It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [mind is a causal oddity in a physical world]:

Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]