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Single Idea 6124
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
]
Full Idea
I argue against the existence of most of the objects alleged to exist by what we might call 'folk ontology'.
Clarification
'Ontology' is the theory of what exists
Gist of Idea
I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
Source
Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.1
A Reaction
This is the programme for Merricks's heroic book, denying (quite plausibly) the need for large objects in our ontology. It seems that ontology must multiply its entities prodigiously, or else be austere in the extreme. Is there no middle way?
The
28 ideas
from 'Objects and Persons'
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14229
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Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics
[Merricks, by Liggins]
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6123
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Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour
[Merricks]
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6124
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I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist
[Merricks]
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6130
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'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object
[Merricks]
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6125
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We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples
[Merricks]
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6127
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'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing
[Merricks]
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6128
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Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region
[Merricks]
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6133
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If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy
[Merricks]
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6131
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Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things
[Merricks]
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6132
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Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts
[Merricks]
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6134
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Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?
[Merricks]
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6135
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A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent
[Merricks]
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6136
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Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox
[Merricks]
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6138
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It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located
[Merricks]
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6137
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Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)
[Merricks]
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6140
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Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons
[Merricks]
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6141
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There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise
[Merricks]
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6143
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Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time
[Merricks]
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6142
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The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways
[Merricks]
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6144
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You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software
[Merricks]
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6145
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Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists
[Merricks]
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6147
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The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties
[Merricks]
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6146
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Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties
[Merricks]
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6148
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Human organisms can exercise downward causation
[Merricks]
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6149
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Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
[Merricks]
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6150
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The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
[Merricks]
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14472
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If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it
[Merricks, by Thomasson]
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14469
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Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage
[Merricks]
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