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Single Idea 6125

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples ]

Full Idea

Eliminativism about physical objects does not require a commitment to (or against) simples.

Clarification

'Simples' are irreducible elements of reality

Gist of Idea

We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples

Source

Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.I)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.3


A Reaction

His strategy is to eliminate objects in favour of whatever it is (an unknown) to which objects actually reduce. His point seems to be clearly correct, just as I might eliminate 'life' from my ontology, without quite knowing what it is.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [minimal small components that make up larger objects]:

The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
Objects are simple [Wittgenstein]
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson]