more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 6133

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts ]

Full Idea

The existence of someone in another world who is a lot like me, but happier, is irrelevant to whether I - this very person - could have been happier, even if we call that other-worldly someone 'my counterpart'.

Gist of Idea

If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy

Source

Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §1.IV)

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.27

A Reaction

He says this is a familiar objection. I retain a lingering deterministic doubt about whether it ever makes to sense to say that I 'could' have been happy, given that I am not. It does seem to make sense to say that I was close to happiness, but missed it.

The 31 ideas with the same theme [there are only closely resembling possible entities]:

13080 Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
11986 The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
11987 Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
11973 Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
11972 Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
17579 Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
11110 We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
13726 Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
14763 Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
16239 To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
11000 If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
14402 If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]