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Single Idea 6139

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Locke's thesis about persons implies that, whenever I have a thought, two thinkers have that thought: me and 'my' thinking substance.

Gist of Idea

Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance

Source

comment on John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Trenton Merricks - Objects and Persons §2.IV

Book Ref

Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.48

A Reaction

Although Locke asserts the existence of a distinct entity, the 'person', he is fairly vague about the ontology involved. Some have suggested that he is a functionalist, and we could say that the substance 'constitutes' the person.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [criticisms the Self as continuity of consciousness]:

5513 Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke]
1345 Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke]
6139 Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke]
1197 No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke]
1364 Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
12511 If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke]
1361 If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke]
21326 Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
1387 Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke]
21314 Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
21452 I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant]
5582 As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant]
5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
1396 We identify persons before identifying conscious states [Carruthers]