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Full Idea
Human organisms have non-redundant causal powers, and so can exercise downward causation.
Clarification
A causal power is 'redundant' if something else also does the job
Gist of Idea
Human organisms can exercise downward causation
Source
Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §4.VII)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.116
A Reaction
The hallmark of property dualism. This notion needs a lot more expansion and exploration than Merricks gives it, and I don't think it will be enough to provide 'free will', or even, as Merricks hopes, to place humans in a distinct ontological category.
| 22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
| 2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14556 | Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum] |