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Single Idea 6150
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
]
Full Idea
The 'warrant' for a belief is that, whatever it is, that makes the difference between mere true belief and knowledge.
Gist of Idea
The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
Source
Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §7.II)
Book Ref
Merricks,Trenton: 'Objects and Persons' [OUP 2003], p.173
A Reaction
Hence a false belief could be well justified, but it could never be warranted. This makes warrant something like the externalist view of justification, a good supporting situation for a belief, rather than an inner awareness of support for it.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[areas of interest concerning justification]:
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6595
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If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion
[Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
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23294
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It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
[Davidson]
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
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8836
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Must all justification be inferential?
[Ginet]
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8837
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Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion
[Ginet]
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12413
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A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge
[Kitcher]
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3564
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Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
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6371
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Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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3752
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Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief
[Bernecker/Dretske]
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21626
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Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered
[Williamson]
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4722
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Modern epistemology centres on debates about foundations, and about external justification
[O'Grady]
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6150
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The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge
[Merricks]
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19540
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Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers
[Dougherty/Rysiew]
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19703
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Epistemic is normally marked out from moral or pragmatic justifications by its truth-goal
[Vahid]
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19729
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'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds
[Black,T]
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