more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 6151

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness ]

Full Idea

Sartre defends a view of consciousness as nothing but a directedness towards objects, insisting that these objects are transcendent with respect to that consciousness; hence Sartre is one of the first genuine externalists.

Clarification

'Transcendent' means beyond, here; Externalists say mind is partly defined by external factors

Gist of Idea

Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects

Source

report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.1

Book Ref

Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.4


A Reaction

An ancestor here is, I think, Schopenhauer (Idea 4166). The idea is attractive, as we are brought up with idea that we have a thing called 'consciousness', but if you removed its contents there would literally be nothing left.

Related Idea

Idea 4166 A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]


The 12 ideas with the same theme [the defining aspect of being conscious]:

We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
Consciousness is shaped dialectically, by opposing forces and concepts [Hegel, by Aho]
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre]
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers]
Consciousness is a process (of neural interactions), not a location, thing, property, connectivity, or activity [Edelman/Tononi]