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Single Idea 6154

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts ]

Full Idea

Some have argued that a mereological whole should not be identified with the sum of its parts on the grounds that the former possess certain properties - specifically modal and (perhaps) counterfactual properties - that the latter lacks.

Clarification

'Modal' concerns necessity; counterfactuals concern what-if situations

Gist of Idea

It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack

Source

Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.14

A Reaction

I am not convinced that modal and counterfactual claims should count as properties. If my pen is heated it melts (a property), but if my pen were intelligent it could do philosophy. Intelligence is a property, but the situation isn't.

The 16 ideas from Mark Rowlands

6177 Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
6178 It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]
6156 The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
6158 Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
6155 Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
6152 Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
6161 Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
6159 Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
6168 The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
6167 Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
6170 Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
6173 Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
6174 If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]