more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 6158

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind ]

Full Idea

One often finds a supervenience thesis concerning the relation between mental and physical properties combined with a token identity theory concerning the relation between mental and physical particulars.

Clarification

'Token identity' asserts identity with something, but of no particular type

Gist of Idea

Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars

Source

Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.21


A Reaction

This brings out the important clarifying point that supervenience is said to be between properties, not substances. The point is that supervenience will always cry out for an explanation, preferably a sensible one.


The 19 ideas with the same theme [total mapping of thoughts onto brain events]:

Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau]
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau]
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau]
If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane]
Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers]
If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K]
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]