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Full Idea
Kuhn and Feyerabend adopt a description theory of reference; the term 'electron' refers to whatever satisfies the descriptions associated with electrons, and since these descriptions vary between theories, so too must the reference.
Gist of Idea
Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions
Source
comment on Thomas S. Kuhn (Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed) [1962]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.3
Book Ref
Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.50
A Reaction
This is a key idea in modern philosophy, showing why all of reality and science were at stake when Kripke and others introduced a causal theory of reference. All the current debates about externalism and essentialism grow from this problem.
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
3866 | If theories are really incommensurable, we could believe them all [Newton-Smith] |
4732 | One may understand a realm of ideas, but be unable to judge their rationality or truth [O'Grady] |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |