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Single Idea 6163

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence ]

Full Idea

If you reject the principle of bivalence (that a proposition is either determinately true or false), then statements are also not subject to the Law of Excluded Middle (P or not-P).

Gist of Idea

If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected

Source

Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.52


A Reaction

I think Rowlands is wrong about this. Excluded Middle could be purely syntacti, or its semantics could be 'True or Not-True'. Only bivalent excluded middle introduces 'True or False'. Compare Idea 4752.

Related Ideas

Idea 4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]

Idea 9024 Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine]


The 18 ideas with the same theme [propositions can only be true or false]:

In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
For Aristotle bivalence is a feature of reality [Aristotle, by Boulter]
How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero]
Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine]
Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett]
Undecidable statements result from quantifying over infinites, subjunctive conditionals, and the past tense [Dummett]
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
A third value for truth might be "indeterminate", or a point on a scale between 'true' and 'false' [O'Grady]
Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
No attempt to deny bivalence has ever been accepted [Sorensen]
If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]