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Full Idea
We view beliefs both as states of the head explanatory of behaviour, and as items possessed of referential truth-conditions.
Gist of Idea
Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions
Source
Colin McGinn (The Structure of Content [1982]), quoted by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.6
Book Ref
Rowlands,Mark: 'Externalism' [Acumen 2003], p.108
A Reaction
McGinn wants to build a two-part account of meaning on this point, which Rowlands resists. Hume just wanted to define belief by a feeling, but it seems obvious that truth must also be involved.
| 20868 | Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
| 2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
| 2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
| 6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |