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Single Idea 6196

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism ]

Full Idea

In the subject there is no antecedent feeling tending to morality; that is impossible, because all feeling is sensuous, and the drives of the moral disposition must be free from every sensuous condition.

Gist of Idea

People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.III)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Practical Reason (Third edition)', ed/tr. Beck,Lewis White [Library of Liberal Arts 1993], p.79

A Reaction

I'm not quite clear (even after reading Kant) why moral drives 'must' be free of sensuousness. Aristotle gives a much better account, when he tells us that the sensuous drives must be trained in the right way, and must be in harmony with the reason.

The 30 ideas with the same theme [morality is just an expression of feelings]:

2360 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22382 We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume]
21409 Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
6196 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
20237 Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
20238 Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
21741 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
23689 Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL]
6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22477 Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
8035 In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
8037 The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
8040 Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
8042 Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
2853 Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
2852 Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
2849 Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
2850 How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
2848 Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
2851 Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
4375 Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]