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Single Idea 6257

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology ]

Full Idea

What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain.

Gist of Idea

You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense

Source

Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV)

Book Ref

'British Moralists 1650-1800 Vol. 1', ed/tr. Raphael,D.D. [Hackett 1991], p.320


A Reaction

We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule?


The 24 ideas with the same theme [moral theories centring on the idea of duty]:

'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas]
We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz]
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant]
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman]
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant]
The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant]
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant]
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant]
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant]
Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche]
Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche]
'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe]
Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe]
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R]
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer]
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas]
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse]
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse]