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Single Idea 6268

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description ]

Full Idea

The line of reasoning of Kuhn and Feyerabend can be blocked by arguing (as I have in various places, and as Saul Kripke has) that scientific terms are not synonymous with descriptions.

Gist of Idea

The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions

Source

Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec II.2)

Book Ref

Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.23

A Reaction

A nice clear statement of the motivation for creating the causal theory of reference. See Idea 6162. We could still go back and ask whether we could block scientific relativism by rethinking how descriptions work, instead of abandoning them.

Related Idea

Idea 6162 Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]

The 25 ideas with the same theme [reference is fixed by a description]:

15155 Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
5387 It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell]
10448 If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P]
6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
6389 To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
16988 Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG]
17029 It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke]
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
10435 A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury]
10451 Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan]
5813 A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan]
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis]
10439 What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
10441 If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
10442 We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
10445 It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
10457 Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
10463 Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
16348 Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati]
16384 Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati]
16352 A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati]
16353 Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati]
16355 Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati]
22245 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]