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Single Idea 6274
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
]
Full Idea
Empathy with others may give less than 'Knowledge', but it gives more than mere logical or physical possibility; it gives plausibility, or (to revive Platonic terminology) it provides 'right opinion'.
Gist of Idea
Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
Source
Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Lec VI)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.75
A Reaction
See Ideas 174 and 2140 for Plato. Putnam is exploring areas of knowledge outside the limits of strict science. Behind this claim seems to lie the Principle of Charity (3971), but a gang of systematic liars (e.g. evil students) would be a problem case.
Related Ideas
Idea 174
True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato]
Idea 2140
True belief without knowledge is like blind people on the right road [Plato]
Idea 3971
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
The
22 ideas
from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences'
6267
|
A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
[Putnam]
|
6266
|
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
[Putnam]
|
6264
|
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
[Putnam]
|
6265
|
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
[Putnam]
|
6268
|
The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
[Putnam]
|
6269
|
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
[Putnam]
|
6270
|
The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
[Putnam]
|
6271
|
How reference is specified is not what reference is
[Putnam]
|
6273
|
Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
[Putnam]
|
6274
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Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
[Putnam]
|
6272
|
'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
[Putnam]
|
17084
|
You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
[Putnam]
|
6282
|
Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
[Putnam]
|
6281
|
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
[Putnam]
|
6283
|
Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
[Putnam]
|
6280
|
Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
[Putnam]
|
6284
|
If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
[Putnam]
|
6276
|
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
[Putnam]
|
6277
|
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
[Putnam]
|
6275
|
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
[Putnam]
|
6279
|
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
[Putnam]
|
6278
|
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
[Putnam]
|