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Single Idea 6275
[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
]
Full Idea
The maxim that 'most of a speaker's beliefs are true' as an a priori principle governing radical translation seems to me to go too far; first, I don't know how to count beliefs; second, most people's beliefs on some topics (philosophy) are probably false.
Gist of Idea
You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
Source
Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three)
Book Ref
Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.101
A Reaction
Putnam prefers a pragmatic view, where charity is applicable if behaviour is involved. Philosophy is too purely theoretical. The extent to which Charity should apply in philosophy seminars is a nice question, which all students should test in practice.
The
22 ideas
from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences'
6267
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A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
[Putnam]
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6266
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We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
[Putnam]
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6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
[Putnam]
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
[Putnam]
|
6268
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
[Putnam]
|
6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
[Putnam]
|
6270
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
[Putnam]
|
6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is
[Putnam]
|
6273
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Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
[Putnam]
|
6274
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Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
[Putnam]
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6272
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'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
[Putnam]
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17084
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You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
[Putnam]
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6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
[Putnam]
|
6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
[Putnam]
|
6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
[Putnam]
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6280
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Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
[Putnam]
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6284
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If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
[Putnam]
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6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
[Putnam]
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6277
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Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
[Putnam]
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6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
[Putnam]
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6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
[Putnam]
|
6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
[Putnam]
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