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Single Idea 6277

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique ]

Full Idea

The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality.

Gist of Idea

Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible

Source

Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three)

Book Ref

Putnam,Hilary: 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' [RKP 1981], p.110

A Reaction

Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts.

Related Ideas

Idea 22309 An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]

Idea 19465 There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]

The 22 ideas from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences'

6267 A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam]
6266 We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
6264 In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
6265 Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
6268 The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam]
6269 Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
6270 The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam]
6271 How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
6273 Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam]
6274 Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam]
6272 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam]
17084 You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam]
6282 Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam]
6281 Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
6283 Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam]
6280 Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam]
6284 If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam]
6276 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
6277 Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
6275 You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam]
6279 A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
6278 We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]