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Full Idea
The redundancy theory is unable to account for the inference from "Oscar's claim is true" and "Oscar's claim is that snow is white" to "the proposition 'that snow is white' is true", and hence to "snow is white".
Gist of Idea
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
Source
Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.2.9)
Book Ref
Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.39
A Reaction
Earlier objections appealed to the fact that the word 'true' seemed to have a use in ordinary speech, but this seems a much stronger one. In general, showing the role of a term in making inferences pins it down better than ordinary speech does.
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
14008 | The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne] |