more on this theme     |     more from this text


Single Idea 6341

[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation ]

Full Idea

The right translation between words of two languages is the mapping that preserves basic patterns of usage - where usage is characterised non-semantically, in terms of circumstances of application, assertibility conditions and inferential role.

Gist of Idea

Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage

Source

Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.6.32)

Book Ref

Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.93


A Reaction

It still strikes me that if you ask why a piece of language is used in a certain way, you find yourself facing something deeper about meaning than mere usage. Horwich cites Wittgenstein and Quine in his support. Could a machine pass his test?


The 23 ideas from Paul Horwich

Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]