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Single Idea 6342

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth ]

Full Idea

One correspondence theory (e.g. early Wittgenstein) concerns representations and facts; alternatively (Tarski, Davidson) the category of fact is eschewed, and the truth of sentences or propositions is built out of relations of reference and satisfaction.

Gist of Idea

Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction

Source

Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.7.35)

Book Ref

Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.104

A Reaction

A helpful distinction. Clearly the notion of a 'fact' is an elusive one ("how many facts are there in this room?"), so it seems quite promising to say that the parts of the sentence correspond, rather than the whole thing.

Related Idea

Idea 17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]

The 23 ideas from Paul Horwich

2798 Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich]
2799 Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich]
8432 Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich]
8431 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
9339 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich]
9341 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
9342 Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich]
9331 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich]
9333 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich]
9332 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich]
9334 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
6334 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
6335 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
6338 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
6339 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
6340 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
6341 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
6342 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]