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Single Idea 6344

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth ]

Full Idea

All uses of the truth predicate are explained by the hypothesis that its entire raison d'être is to help us say things about unarticulated propositions, and in particular to express generalisations about them.

Gist of Idea

Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them

Source

Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Concl)

Book Ref

Horwich,Paul: 'Truth (2nd edn)' [OUP 1998], p.118

A Reaction

This certain is a very deflationary notion of truth. Articulated propositions are considered to stand on their own two feet, without need of 'is true'. He makes truth sound like a language game, though. Personally I prefer to mention reality.

The 32 ideas with the same theme [truth has no nature, and refers to nothing]:

1564 True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
19185 Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
4749 We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
12129 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
19170 Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
23287 Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
23299 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
6336 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
6337 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
6344 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
9921 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
14419 Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
12437 Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
15325 Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
15344 Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
15356 Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
15358 Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
15359 Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
15368 This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
16338 Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
16317 The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
16316 Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
16320 Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
16319 Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
19075 Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]