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Single Idea 6350

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction ]

Full Idea

Contrary to what Hume supposed, it must be possible for the premises of an argument to support a conclusion without logically entailing it.

Gist of Idea

Premises can support an argument without entailing it

Source

comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748]) by J Pollock / J Cruz - Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) §1.2

Book Ref

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.9


A Reaction

This seems to me an extremely important point, made with nice clarity. It is why people who are good at logic are not necessarily good at philosophy. The latter is about thinking rationally, not following the laws of deduction.


The 12 ideas with the same theme [role of pure reason in inductive inference]:

Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume]
Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume]
Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross]