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Single Idea 6351

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty ]

Full Idea

One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively.

Gist of Idea

Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2)

Book Ref

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.10

A Reaction

I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore).

Related Ideas

Idea 2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]

Idea 2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]

The 34 ideas with the same theme [possibility or necessity of certainty in knowledge]:

389 How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato]
1673 Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle]
23175 The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9090 Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
24019 If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes]
9807 In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes]
1583 In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
1585 Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
1582 Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
2256 Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
3657 Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes]
17193 True ideas intrinsically involve the highest degree of certainty [Spinoza]
21863 You only know you are certain of something when you actually are certain of it [Spinoza]
17199 A man who assents without doubt to a falsehood is not certain, but lacks a cause to make him waver [Spinoza]
15995 The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke]
12562 General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke]
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
13006 Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy [Leibniz]
21772 In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel]
14858 Being certain presumes that there are absolute truths, and means of arriving at them [Nietzsche]
4487 A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche]
22867 The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
21516 We want certainty in order achieve secure results for action [Dewey]
9636 My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]
5936 Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
23073 Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran]
23078 Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran]
5183 Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer]
2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
3582 Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M]
2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]