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Single Idea 6351

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty ]

Full Idea

One of the most important modern advances in epistemology was the recognition of defeasible reasons; it is now generally acknowledged that most of our reasoning proceeds defeasibly rather than deductively.

Gist of Idea

Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.2)

Book Ref

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.10

A Reaction

I agree totally. This is why fallibilism is clearly a correct position in epistemology (e.g. Ideas 2736 and 2755). Deduction is not the only grounds given for certainty - there are rationalist foundations (Descartes) and empiricist foundations (Moore).

Related Ideas

Idea 2736 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]

Idea 2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]

The 22 ideas from 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'

6346 The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
6351 Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
6352 Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6355 Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6357 Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
6360 Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
6362 Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
6364 We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
6365 Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
6366 Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
6370 Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
6371 Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
6372 Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
6374 To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]