more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 6353
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
]
Full Idea
We argue that all foundations theories are false, for the simple reason that people rarely have any epistemological basic beliefs, and never have enough to provide a foundation for the rest of our knowledge.
Gist of Idea
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
Source
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3)
Book Ref
Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.25
A Reaction
Once surprising things start to happen in a film, we rapidly jettison our normal basic beliefs, to be ready for surprises. However, it seems to me that quite a lot of beliefs are hard-wired into us, or inescapably arise from the use of our senses.
The
22 ideas
from 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'
6346
|
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6351
|
Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6352
|
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6354
|
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6355
|
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6353
|
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6357
|
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6358
|
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6359
|
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6360
|
Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6361
|
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6362
|
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6363
|
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6364
|
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6365
|
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6366
|
Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6367
|
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6370
|
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6371
|
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6372
|
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6373
|
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6374
|
To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing
[Pollock/Cruz]
|