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Single Idea 6354
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
]
Full Idea
All coherence theories fail, because they are unable to accommodate perception as the basic source of our knowledge of the world.
Gist of Idea
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
Source
J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §1.5.3)
Book Ref
Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.25
A Reaction
An interesting claim, which the authors attempt to justify. They say it is direct realism, because the perceptions justify, without any intervening beliefs. My immediate thought is that they might justify knowledge of primary qualities, but not secondary.
The
22 ideas
from J Pollock / J Cruz
6346
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The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6351
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Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6352
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Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6354
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Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6355
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Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6357
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Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6358
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One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6359
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Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6360
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Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6362
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Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6363
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Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
6364
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We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6365
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Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6366
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Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6367
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Coherence theories isolate justification from the world
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6370
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Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6371
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Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable)
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6372
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Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6373
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Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6374
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To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing
[Pollock/Cruz]
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