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Single Idea 6358

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

If I fall flat on my back running to a class, my belief that I was late for class may cause me to have the belief that there are birds in the trees, but I do not believe the latter on the basis of the former.

Gist of Idea

One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.3.1)

Book Ref

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.36


A Reaction

A nice example, which fairly conclusively demolishes any causal theory of justification. My example is believing correctly that the phone ring is from mother, because she said she would call. Maybe causation is needed somewhere in the right theory.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]