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Single Idea 6363

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique ]

Full Idea

Either no belief is prima facie justified or all beliefs are prima facie justified; …we regard this as a decisive refutation of foundationalism.

Clarification

'Prima facie' means 'at first glance'

Gist of Idea

Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are

Source

J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §2.5.5)

Book Ref

Pollock,J.L./Cruz,J: 'Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (2nd)' [Rowman and Littlefield 1999], p.65


A Reaction

The full text must he examined, but it is not at all clear to me how my belief that quantum theory is correct could be even remotely as prima facie justified as my belief that this is my hand. I don't think basic beliefs need be sharply divided off.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]:

It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]