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Full Idea
We have the idea of belief from its role in the interpretation of language; as a private attitude it is not intelligible except in relation to public language. So a creature must be a member of a speech community to have the concept of belief.
Gist of Idea
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community
Source
Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.22)
Book Ref
'Mind and Language', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [OUP 1977], p.22
A Reaction
This shows how Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4152) hovers behind Davidson's philosophy. The idea is quite persuasive. A solitary creature just follows its mental states. The question of whether it believes them is a meta-thought.
Related Idea
Idea 4152 Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |