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Single Idea 6410
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
]
Full Idea
Russell argued that the only 'logically proper' names are those which denote particular entities with which one can be acquainted. The best examples are 'this' and 'that'; other apparent names turn out, when analysed, to be definite descriptions.
Clarification
A 'definite description' has the form 'the so-and-so'
Gist of Idea
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (On the Nature of Acquaintance [1914]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2
Book Ref
Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.35
A Reaction
This view is firm countered by the causal theory of reference, proposed by Kripke and others, in which not only people like Aristotle are 'baptised' with a name, but also natural kinds such as water. It is hard to disagree with Kripke on this.
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[names do no more than pick out an object]:
13789
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Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing
[Plato]
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4944
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Mill says names have denotation but not connotation
[Mill, by Kripke]
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7762
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Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object
[Mill, by Lycan]
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4978
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The meaning of a proper name is the designated object
[Frege]
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6410
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The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions.
[Russell, by Grayling]
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15159
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The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper
[Russell, by Soames]
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10449
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Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications
[Russell, by Bach]
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10823
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A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function
[Tarski]
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7089
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A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object
[Wittgenstein]
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21879
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Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word
[Derrida]
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9171
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The function of names is simply to refer
[Kripke]
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8957
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Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism
[Kripke, by Szabó]
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10428
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Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
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4959
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A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent
[Kripke]
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16982
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A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same!
[Kripke]
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
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16405
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To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
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10456
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Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription
[Bach]
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13399
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Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators
[Jubien]
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7306
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If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
[Miller,A]
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
[Hofweber]
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18945
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Millians say a name just means its object
[Sawyer]
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