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Single Idea 6411

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims.

Gist of Idea

Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims

Source

comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2

Book Ref

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.36

A Reaction

The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier.

Related Idea

Idea 6067 Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]

The 21 ideas with the same theme [descriptions which seem to pick out a unique item]:

13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
6411 Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
10433 Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5385 The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
18779 'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague]
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
13814 Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
13816 Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
13817 Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
13813 Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
13848 We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
15414 The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]