more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 6416

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds ]

Full Idea

Russell gives an argument that other minds exist, because if one is entitled to believe this, then one can rely on the testimony of others, which, jointly with one's own experience, will give powerful support to the view that there a real spatial world.

Gist of Idea

Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], 3) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2

Book Ref

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.45

A Reaction

I rather like this argument. It is quite close to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which also seems to refute scepticism about other minds. I think Russell's line, using testimony, knowledge and realism, may be better than Wittgenstein's.

The 21 ideas from 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]