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Single Idea 6418

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism ]

Full Idea

Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences.

Gist of Idea

Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations

Source

report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3

Book Ref

Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.61

A Reaction

This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too.

Related Idea

Idea 5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]

The 31 ideas with the same theme [reality is just actual and potential appearances]:

1549 Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
2261 My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
12739 If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
5192 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
5174 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
3931 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
5601 There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant]
3583 External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill]
18988 Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch]
23207 Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
6418 Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling]
6466 Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
4153 Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
20743 Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
8824 No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim]
6525 Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
18209 We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
8199 The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
3592 Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
2721 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
2722 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
6522 Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
6359 Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
7301 The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7302 Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
7303 If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
20963 A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W]