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Full Idea
Russell reverted to realism when he recognised that the notion of causality is problematic for phenomenalism; things in the world seem to affect one another causally in ways that are difficult to account for properly by mere reports of sense-experiences.
Gist of Idea
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations
Source
report of Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Matter [1927]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.3
Book Ref
Grayling,A.C.: 'Russell' [OUP 1996], p.61
A Reaction
This is very interesting, and doesn't seem to have been enough to make A.J. Ayer eschew phenomenalism (Idea 5170). Once your metaphysics becomes realist (like Russell), your account of perception and objects has to change too.
Related Idea
Idea 5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |